TLP:CLEAR · Public security advisory · Preliminary
Bitrise security incident: attacker behaviour, indicators and monitors
Bitrise security incident, November 2026: attacker indicators and detection ideas
PRELIMINARY, investigation ongoing · All times UTC
VERSION | 1.0 |
CREATED | 2026-11-17 |
RELEASE PREPARED | 2026-11-17 04:49:20 UTC |
EVIDENCE CUT-OFF | 2026-11-16 19:01 UTC |
ACTIVITY WINDOW | 2026-10-25 01:43 → 2026-11-14 19:47 UTC |
DISTRIBUTION | public; no restriction on sharing |
MACHINE-READABLE COMPANIONS | |
TLP:CLEAR | This advisory may be shared and republished without restriction. It is prepared for public distribution so that security teams at any organisation can use it in their SIEM and detection tooling. |
Preliminary. | the investigation is still open and counts, times and indicators may change. Each revision carries a new version number. |
This advisory shares selected observations and detection ideas. It is not an exhaustive indicator inventory, a complete incident report, or a determination of the impact on any individual organization.
1. Purpose
This document describes what an external actor did against Bitrise between 2026-10-25 and 2026-11-14, as recorded in our logs. It is written for threat-detection and response teams. It gives you the actor's infrastructure and tooling, the behaviour at each stage, and monitor ideas, so that you can search your own telemetry and build detections.
The activity came in two phases: about three days of scanning and probing in late October, then a return in mid-November that went from a new sign-up to operating with stolen credentials in under a day and continued for about two more days. The seen-window of each indicator is in sections 2.1 and 2.4 and in the CSV.
2. Indicators
The full set, with first/last seen, confidence and usage class, is in bitrise-incident-public-iocs.csv (48 rows). bitrise-incident-public-stix21.json carries 22 of the 24 match indicators (the two CI app names have no standard STIX pattern and are in the CSV only), plus the technique mapping. In the CSV, siem_use is:
match: suitable for retro-hunt and alerting on its own.correlate: weak link or broad pattern. Use to enrich or join; never block or alert on it alone.context: common tools and commodity paths. Supporting detail only when another indicator also matches.
An IP address is not a person or a country of origin. Two of the three main addresses are cloud or subscriber addresses that get reassigned, so matches outside the seen window mean little.
2.1 Source addresses
| ADDRESS | NETWORK | SEEN (UTC) | ROLE | CONFIDENCE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
74.211.97.67 | Cluster Logic Inc (CL-1210), US-CA; AS25820 | 2026-11-12 19:13 → 11-14 19:47 | Stolen-credential use against web/API, GCP, GitHub, Google Workspace | HIGH |
118.100.234.120 | TM Technology Services (AS4788), MY | 2026-11-10 10:30 → 11-14 14:17 | Account registration, CI builds, fuzzing, link reuse | HIGH |
95.40.73.129 | AWS (AS16509), HK | 2026-10-25 01:43 → 10-27 16:10 | Reconnaissance, probe accounts, artifact requests, SSRF | HIGH |
74.82.199.230 | Cluster Logic Inc (CL-1210), US-CA | 2026-11-14 16:27 → 16:29 | One account sign-up | LOW same hosting provider only |
185.197.251.16 | Contabo, DE | 2026-10-30 19:01 → 19:10 | Two probe-named sign-ups | LOW naming pattern only |
2.2 Why we treat the three main addresses as one operator
| LINK | EVIDENCE | STRENGTH |
|---|---|---|
95.40.73.129 ↔ 118.100.234.120 | On Nov 12 the second address reopened the public install-page links for 11 apps, all from the 70 used by the first on Oct 25. The links contain unguessable hashes. | STRONG |
118.100.234.120 ↔ 74.211.97.67 | The first request from 74.211.97.67 used the actor's own app and token; the actor account's sign-in address moved from one to the other. | STRONG |
All three | Rare client norma/0.4 on all three; same curl/7.88.1, Python-urllib/3.12, ffuf v2.3.0; same primary target; i<number> naming in user agents, canary paths and workflow names. | CIRCUMSTANTIAL |
The tooling shows signs of automation: user agents that describe themselves as authorized testing, iteration-numbered probes, a documentation-fetching client, made-up hostnames, and dozens of keys tried within minutes. Whether an AI model drove it, and which one, cannot be determined from the logs. Nothing in this evidence establishes who the operator is or where they are.
2.3 User agents
Usable alone:
pentest-probe-i5938/1.0 |
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; authorized-pentest/bitrise-readonly) |
Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) research-readonly |
Mozilla/5.0 (research; read-only; pentest) |
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; authorized-security-research) |
bitrise-pentest-probe/1.0 (authorized read-only) |
pentest-probe-readonly/1.0 (authorized read-only baseline) |
norma/0.4 (substring) |
Two of these embed the target's name, and the number in the first is a counter, so on your side expect variants. Family pattern (check hits against your own contracted testing):
(?i)(pentest-probe|authorized-pentest|authorized-security-research|research-readonly|research; read-only; pentest|\(authorized read-only) |
Context only, never alone: curl/7.88.1, curl/8.7.1, Python-urllib/3.12, python-requests/2.34.2, Fuzz Faster U Fool v2.3.0, git/2.39.5, and the whole-string user agent recon on GitHub App API calls.
2.4 Accounts registered by the actor
| ADDRESS | SEEN (UTC) | CONFIDENCE |
|---|---|---|
[email protected] (username auwiqns) | 2026-11-12 14:00 → 11-14 | HIGH |
2026-10-25 19:58 | HIGH | |
2026-10-25 20:09 | HIGH | |
2026-10-25 20:14 | HIGH | |
2026-10-25 23:00 | HIGH | |
2026-10-26 08:18 | HIGH | |
[email protected] (username pqprobe386873) | 2026-10-30 19:01 | LOW |
[email protected] (username probe387344) | 2026-10-30 19:09 | LOW |
The domains are public disposable-mail or mail-testing services and are not indicators themselves.
2.5 Strings and naming
| MARKER | WHERE TO LOOK |
|---|---|
/_i6084_probe_missing, /nope-1774; pattern /_i\d{3,5}_probe_[a-z_]+ or /nope-\d{3,5} | Inbound HTTP paths. These are SSRF canaries, so the request arrives from the victim service's egress, not from the actor. |
zzq-random-nonexist-9182 as a subdomain label | DNS queries, HTTP Host, TLS SNI |
Tenant or workspace identifier nope in API paths | API access logs (placeholder the actor used when probing endpoints) |
App and workflow names idor-probe-812, i871-probe, i901a, i901b, i1040probe, i1170certs, i1170den, i1222, i1246net, i1294probe, i1655nodeopt | CI/CD and developer-platform tenants created by new accounts |
Build-log banner === I871C START followed by a dump of VM metadata attribute keys | CI job output |
url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ together with path=../../etc/passwd and image=http://evil/ | Query strings on URL-fetching endpoints (preview, Open Graph, image proxy, webhook test) |
3. Behaviour patterns and monitor ideas
Each entry gives what we observed and a monitor that detects it. Thresholds are ours; tune them to your baseline.
3.1 Edge and web application
| OBSERVED | MONITOR IDEA |
|---|---|
User agents announcing "authorized", "read-only", "pentest" or "research", rotated across seven variants from one address, two of them embedding our company name. | Alert on user agents matching the family pattern in 2.3, or containing your own company name next to "pentest", "probe" or "authorized", when no test is scheduled. |
36,698 requests to more than 20 hostnames in three days from one address; 48,084 in six hours from another, with ffuf. | Per-source count of distinct hostnames and of 404s per hour. |
Requests to made-up subdomains ( zzq-random-nonexist-9182.<zone>) to learn how wildcard DNS and routing respond. | Alert on Host/SNI values that match no deployed service, especially random-looking labels from a source that is also scanning. |
One burst of POSTs to generic product paths within eight minutes (Axis2, Webmin, Artifactory, Drupal, Redfish). All 404. | Low value alone. Use as a tag that raises the score of the source. |
Probing of internal-looking hostnames for Elasticsearch, Kibana, Wazuh and Grafana paths (61 requests in 55 minutes) and of an LLM chat deployment (Open WebUI) for sign-in and configuration endpoints ( /api/config, /api/v1/openai/config, /api/v1/ollama/config, /api/v1/rag/config, /api/v1/tools). | Alert on external requests to those path sets. |
After the main address was blocked, requests continued for a day and a sign-up arrived from another address at the same hosting provider. | Keep a blocked source under observation, and watch the same ASN for new sign-ups in the following days. |
3.2 Sign-up, accounts and sessions
| OBSERVED | MONITOR IDEA |
|---|---|
Seven sign-ups with disposable-mail addresses and "probe" naming. Five from one address within 13 hours. | Alert on several sign-ups from one address or ASN within a day, on disposable-mail domains combined with security-testing words in the address or username. |
The new accounts never created a project. They created 15 one-hour API tokens, hit the password-reset endpoint 14 times in two minutes, tried to enable 2FA, and tried to delete a token ID that was not theirs. | Alert on a fresh account whose first actions are security-settings endpoints (token create, password change, 2FA, token delete) with no product use, and on validation errors (422) in bursts on those endpoints. |
An employee's API token was used from the actor's address while the employee was active from a different country. A service account's token was used eight times in 13 minutes from an address outside the two ranges it had used all week. | Alert on a token used concurrently from two networks, and on machine-account tokens used from a first-seen network. This needs logs that record which token made each call. |
3.3 Multi-tenant application and API
| OBSERVED | MONITOR IDEA |
|---|---|
Cross-tenant test: within two and a half minutes the account requested four kinds of sensitive file listing for six apps in other tenants (all 404), then made the same calls against its own new app as a control (all 200). | Alert on one principal receiving 404 or 403 on resource-scoped endpoints for several resource IDs it does not own within minutes. The 404-then-200 control pattern is distinctive. |
Workspace API tokens created and deleted within 20 seconds. | Alert on credentials created and deleted within a minute. |
Share links with unguessable hashes, belonging to 70 different apps, opened by one address within a day. The links were used to obtain artifact download URLs. 13 anonymous bucket-listing attempts followed. The same link list reappeared 18 days later from another network. | Alert on one source opening capability links that belong to many different tenants. Treat that as link harvesting: the links came from somewhere outside your platform. |
23 "send test webhook" requests in 40 minutes from a new account, preceded by four probes using the workspace name nope. The feature makes the server call a URL the user supplies. | Alert on repeated use of any "test this URL" feature by one account, and on destinations in private, link-local or metadata ranges. |
SSRF: a URL-fetching service was made to call the cloud metadata address (169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal), the Kubernetes API hostname and internal service names. A canary path arrived back at our own edge from our own egress address with Go-http-client/2.0. | Alert on egress from application workloads to metadata addresses and cluster-internal names. Alert on requests reaching your edge from your own egress addresses. |
66 authentication failures against a control-plane API in 80 minutes from one address, cycling credential types: a build-scoped JWT, a personal access token, an agent token. A day later an admin-secret header was tried from the second address. | Alert on one source presenting several different credential header types to one API. |
3.4 CI/CD and build infrastructure
| OBSERVED | MONITOR IDEA |
|---|---|
Within 70 minutes of sign-up the account connected a public placeholder repository ( octocat/Hello-World) to four apps and ran builds whose only content was the actor's scripts. Workflow names were iteration-numbered and named their purpose: i1170certs, i1170den, i1246net, i1655nodeopt. | Alert on new accounts running builds against placeholder or empty repositories, and on the naming pattern in the CSV. |
A build queried the VM's instance metadata and dumped the startup script to look for credentials. A key found this way was tried from outside 17 minutes later. | Alert on build steps that query instance metadata attributes, and on a credential's first use from outside shortly after a build that touched metadata. |
During the builds, the account's credentials were used against the platform API from the platform's own build egress, and each build log was fetched through the API right after the build. | Alert on new accounts calling the platform API from inside their own builds, and on build → fetch-log loops minutes apart (automation iterating on output). |
3.5 Cloud control plane (observed on GCP; the patterns apply to any cloud)
Scale for calibration: thousands of audit entries from the actor's addresses in two days, across dozens of identities.
| OBSERVED | MONITOR IDEA |
|---|---|
Service-account keys used from hosting-provider and subscriber addresses with Python-urllib/3.12 and curl/7.88.1. | Alert on any service-account key used from outside your cloud and corporate ranges. This one rule matches every stolen-key use described here. |
About 40 service-account identities tried from one address in seven minutes. | Alert on distinct principals per source address per 10 minutes. |
A key with almost no rights made 82 calls and every one was denied: list secrets, list buckets, get IAM policy, list service accounts, list VMs. | Alert on a principal whose calls are all PERMISSION_DENIED across several services. This is someone learning what a key can do. |
One Terraform service-account key touched hundreds of projects in under two hours, listing secrets and buckets in each. | Alert on distinct projects per principal per hour, and on enumeration calls by deploy identities outside pipeline hours and addresses. |
After listing storage buckets, the actor went for Terraform state ( *.tfstate) and key-material file types (.p12, .p8, .keystore, .ks): hundreds of object reads in under an hour with one identity. | Alert on reads of state and key-material objects by anything other than the pipeline identity and address. |
Reads of dozens of distinct secrets in the cloud secret store (Google Secret Manager) by one service account within a few hours. | Alert on secret reads by identities that have never read secrets, and on count of distinct secrets per identity. This needs data-access (read) audit logging on the secret store. |
A user's own cloud credential (the CLI OAuth client), not a service account, made 294 calls in 41 minutes from the actor's address. | Alert on user credentials used from a first-seen network, and on CLI client use from hosting ASNs. |
Credentials were used within minutes of being obtained: two minutes after a secret reveal, 17 minutes after a build printed a key, and a GitHub App key 18 minutes after a burst of secret reads. | Correlate "secret revealed or read" events with first use of any credential from a new address in the following hour. |
3.6 Source control (GitHub)
| OBSERVED | MONITOR IDEA |
|---|---|
Bulk cloning of private repositories with stolen credentials, all with git/2.39.5 from one address, using deploy keys, bot-account classic tokens, a machine SSH key and a GitHub App token. Ten repositories were cloned in four minutes with one key. | Alert on git.clone from a first-seen address for bot and machine identities; on distinct repositories cloned per credential per hour; on any deploy-key use from outside your CI ranges. |
A git.push with a deploy key 7 seconds after cloning. No ref changed. | Alert on push attempts by credentials that have only ever read. |
GitHub App private-key use: GET /app (once with user agent recon), GET /app/installations, POST /app/installations/{id}/access_tokens, GET /installation/repositories, then a clone. Under a minute from first call to token, for two different Apps. | For Apps you own: alert on any JWT-authenticated call or token mint from an address that is not your backend. |
3.7 SaaS OAuth (Google Workspace)
| OBSERVED | MONITOR IDEA |
|---|---|
An employee's OAuth token for an internal app was used from the actor's address: a burst of dozens of calendar and directory enumeration calls in under eight minutes. There was no interactive login, so login reports showed nothing. | Monitor token and API-activity reports as well as login reports. Alert on OAuth token use from a first-seen ASN, and on directory or calendar enumeration bursts by one token. |
4. Techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)
| ID | TECHNIQUE | HOW IT APPEARED |
|---|---|---|
T1595.002, T1595.003 | Active scanning: vulnerability and wordlist scanning | Multi-day scanning of 20+ hostnames; ffuf |
T1583.003 | Acquire infrastructure: VPS | AWS, Contabo and Cluster Logic hosts |
T1585.002 | Establish accounts: email accounts | Disposable-mail and Gmail addresses for sign-ups |
T1190 | Exploit public-facing application | SSRF in a URL-fetching service; cross-tenant probes, all refused |
T1078.004 | Valid accounts: cloud accounts | Service-account keys; one user cloud credential |
T1552.005 | Unsecured credentials: cloud instance metadata | Build script queried VM instance metadata and the startup script for credentials |
T1552.001 | Unsecured credentials: credentials in files | Terraform state in buckets; build logs |
T1555.006 | Credentials from cloud secrets management stores | Secret Manager reads; CI secret-reveal endpoint |
T1528, T1550.001 | Steal and use application access tokens | API tokens, OAuth tokens, GitHub App private keys |
T1580, T1526, T1619 | Cloud infrastructure, service and storage discovery | Listing projects, secrets, IAM policies, buckets |
T1530 | Data from cloud storage | Targeted reads of state and key-material file types in storage buckets |
T1213.003 | Data from code repositories | Repository clones with stolen deploy keys, bot tokens and a GitHub App token |
CONTACT [email protected]
Please do not send secrets, tokens or personal data that is not needed to identify the event.